Purpose: The chapter studies the impact of fiscal policy on the stabilization of peace in the aftermath of a civil war.
Introduction
Conservative estimates suggest that in the five decades following the end of World War II the total death toll generated by civil wars is five times higher than the interstate death toll. More than 70 countries (roughly one third of the total membership of the United Nations system) experienced episodes of large-scale civil violence, most of which produced massive refugee flows and economic devastation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) . Given these figures, it is not surprising that the causes of civil war have become the object of a recent, lively literature at the intersection of economics and political science (see, inter alia, Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Collier et al. 2008a; Miguel et al. 2004; Lujala et al. 2005; Humprehys, 2005) . Within this avenue of research, specific attention is now being devoted to the aftermath of a conflict 1 . As empirically shown by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) , the risk of a civil conflict decreases with the time elapsed since the last civil conflict. The implication is that the post-conflict period is particularly risky and hence it is important to study the conditions for the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of a conflict.
The available empirical evidence indicates that the maintenance of peace during the postconflict transition critically hinges upon the interaction of political and economic factors. Among those latter ones, the literature gives prominent relevance to the level and growth of per-capita GDP and the degree of dependence on natural resources (see Collier et al. 2008b) . Not much attention has been instead devoted to the role of macroeconomic policies, particularly fiscal policy. The case studies reported in Boyce and O'Donnell (2007) emphasize the importance of public finance in re-building state institutions following a civil conflict. Collier (2009) discusses reforms and strategies that post-conflict economies ought to undertake to increase revenues and to strengthen the effectiveness of spending. However, cross-country evidence on how different dimensions of fiscal policy affect the probability of successfully completing the post-conflict transition is still missing. In other words, from the perspective of a policymaker in a post-conflict country it would be important to be able to answer questions like: Should governments focus more on government consumption or public investment? Should governments worry about the stabilisation of public finance (eventually downsizing government) or expand the public sector? Is the burden of debt going to be a cause of post-conflict failure? What is the contribution of budget grants to peace stabilization? However, the existing research leaves these (and related) questions largely unanswered.
The purpose of this chapter is to fill in the void through an econometric analysis of the links between fiscal policy and post-conflict peace in African countries. The focus on Africa is justified on two grounds. First, about half of all civil wars have taken place in Africa and even today several countries on the continent are torn by civil conflicts and/or go through a difficult post-conflict stabilization. In this sense, one can argue that Africa is a good case study for researchers interested in the dynamic interaction between economics and conflict. Second, an econometric analysis of the type we have in mind requires sufficiently comprehensive fiscal policy data and these are often not available for many post-conflict countries. However, for the specific case of Africa, the Africa Development Database of the World Bank provides a valuable source of information. Combining this database with country sources we collected from national statistical offices, we have been able to construct a panel dataset of fiscal policy variables for all of the post-conflict countries in Africa covering the period 1965-2008. Of course, the dataset has several missing observations, especially at the beginning of the sample. Still, it contains enough data points for us to be able to apply formal regression analysis tools.
The theoretical prior of our analysis draws on the game-theoretic analysis of international relations and military interactions (see for instance O'Neill, 1994) . In the aftermath of a conflict, the stability of peace depends on whether or not the fighting parties will stick to the peace agreement. This peace agreement can be represented as the allocation of a peace payoff between the contending parties. The larger the payoff and the more equitable the distribution, the longer peace will be maintained. Our argument is that fiscal policy is one of the key determinants of the size of the peace dividend. At the same time, it is through fiscal policy that the "winner" (the government) can make the allocation of the dividend more or less equitable. The size and scope of government expenditure, the incidence of taxation, and the burden of debt are therefore likely to be important drivers of peace stabilization. To test this hypothesis we will be looking at how fiscal policy variables affect the probability of a country to successfully complete ten years of continued peace after the end of a conflict. We will also study how the dynamics of fiscal policy variables differ between successful and unsuccessful post-conflict stabilizations.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. The success of post-conflict transition does not require downsizing the government.
2 On the contrary, successful post-conflict transitions are on average characterised by an increase in the size of the government. However, this increase occurs in such a way that the overall stability of public finances is not heavily compromised: both expenditures and revenues increase at a comparable pace. Moreover, in successful post-conflict transitions, the increase in government size involves an increase in the incidence of capital expenditure relative to government consumption (whose contribution to horizontal redistribution is questionable). On the revenue side, budgetary grants appear to strengthen the chances of success. At the same time, and perhaps contrary to common-sense intuition, a larger burden of debt does not seem to compromise the probability of successfully completing the post-conflict transition.
In the rest of the chapter we present first a few simple empirical regularities concerning fiscal variables during the post-conflict transition. We then provide econometric evidence from the estimation of a probit model of post-conflict peace. Subsequently, we discuss the difference in the dynamic of fiscal policy between a successful and an unsuccessful post-conflict episode. Finally, we formulate some conclusions and policy recommendations. The Appendix reports the full chronology of conflicts in Africa and the description of the variables used in the analysis.
Some preliminary empirical regularities
2 Government downsizing has been for long a common practice in reforming the public sector of developing economies. This view was still implicit in the Washington Consensus of the mid '90s. However, it has since then progressively changed (see USAID, 2005 and UNDESA, 2005 for a discussion of different approaches). Our results suggest that from the perspective of peace stabilization, a reform of the public sector that involves government downsizing might be particularly risky.
For the purpose of this chapter, the post-conflict period is identified with the first ten years that follow the end of a conflict. 3 The chronology of civil wars for the African continent is based on Gleditsch (2004) and updated to 2008 (using the information available up to the end of 2009). The full chronology is reported in the Appendix.
A post-conflict transition can be successful or unsuccessful. Success occurs when the country effectively stays at peace for the whole of the ten years. A failure instead occurs whenever a new war goes off within less than ten years from the end of the previous conflict. In the rest of the chapter, we refer to SPC as the successful post-conflict and UPC as the unsuccessful post-conflict. In the case of African countries, we count 15 successful post-conflict transitions and 15 unsuccessful post-conflict transitions. There are also nine countries that at the cut-off date of 2008 were still at peace, but had not yet completed the ten years spell. These are regarded as "ongoing" post-conflict transitions. All in all, the unit of observation in the dataset is a post-conflict episode and we include a total of 33 episodes. 4 For each episode, data are reported on an annual basis. Fiscal data fully cover 21 of the 33 episodes (11 SPC and 10 UPC). Another two episodes (notably Algeria SPC 1964 -1973 and Burundi SPC 1973 -1982 are covered only partially. For the remaining 10 episodes, no fiscal data are available (see Appendix for details about the availability of fiscal data by country).
As a way to gauge some simple empirical regularities on the behaviour of fiscal policy variables in post-conflict situations, Table 1 reports some basic summary statistics. For each of 24 fiscal policy indicators (see appendix for a full list of variables), the table reports the average (μ) and the standard deviation (σ) in UPC and SPC. To better appreciate the differences between successful and unsuccessful post-conflicts, the table also reports the standardised mean difference of each variable. This is equal to the average of the variable in SPC minus the average of the variable in UPC divided by the standard deviation of the variable in the full sample. Finally, the table also reports average and standard deviation of the fiscal variables in states of war and peace as references to compare the statistics computed for UPC and SPC. Note that by periods of peace, here we mean the years of peace that follow the end of successful post-conflict transition until the beginning of a new war (or until 2006, in case no new war has began since the conclusion of the last-one).
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Focusing on the differences between UPC and SPC, there are indeed a few variables that exhibit a rather large (positive or negative) standardised mean difference. Both the level of debt (debt) and the incidence of interest payments on total expenditure (int_p) are much higher in SPC than in UPC. In fact, the standardised mean difference of debt is the largest of all variables. The positive sign implies that on average SPC is characterised by higher debt levels (and a larger incidence of interest payments on total expenditure) than UPC. This is indeed quite surprising as it suggests that the burden of debt might not be an obstacle to the maintenance of post-conflict peace. SPC is also characterised by a significantly larger level of current grants (grt_c). Therefore, it seems that providing post-conflict countries with budgetary grants is more conducive to peace than granting debt relief. We will return on this important policy conclusion later on, also addressing the issue of possible reverse causality.
A large mean difference is also observed with respect to defence expenditure (def): in SPC defence and military expenditure is effectively much lower than in UPC. This observation is coherent with previous findings by Collier and Hoeffler (2006) . Two issues are worth noting, however. First of all, the sample of observations is quite small. The variable def is not available for several of the episodes of unsuccessful post-conflict transition and hence we have to be careful in making generalizations. Second, reverse causality might be particular strong in this case: it is not necessarily a large military expenditure that causes the failure of the post-conflict transition, but rather, it might be that the expectation of a failure (possibly already evident in the first years of post-conflict transition) leads the government to spend more on the military.
SPC is also characterised by larger levels of public education on expenditure (edu). Unfortunately nothing can be said about health expenditure as we have no observations on health for the countries in UPC). Bearing in mind that also for edu the number of actual observations in each state is small, the positive association between higher education expenditure and post-conflict success is coherent with the idea that the stabilization of peace requires a larger provision of public goods.
Government size appears to be on average higher in UPC, but differences between successful and unsuccessful post-conflicts are relatively small. The only exception is represented by public sector wages (wages), which are larger in SPC. In fact, as it will be discussed later on, the critical difference between UPC and SPC with respect to government size is not related to average levels, but rather to dynamics in the first years of the post-conflict transition. With respect to composition of expenditures and revenues, we observe a rather larger incidence of government consumption on total expenditure (gov_p) in UPC. On the contrary, non tax revenues (rev_ntx and rev_ntx_p) are generally larger in SPC than in UPC. Reflecting the small differences in average government size across the two states, indicators of fiscal balance also do not differ much between UPC and SPC. If anything, SPC tends to display better balances than UPC when grants are included.
Looking beyond averages: evidence from probit analysis
We now move beyond period averages to estimate the effect of fiscal policy variables on the probability of successfully completing the post-conflict transition. Our statistical framework is the standard binary choice model. Let Y = 0 denote the SPC state and Y = 1 the UPC state. Given a set of country characteristics x, we can write the probabilities of being in each state as:
( 1) ( 2) where β, the parameters to be estimated, represent the impact of changes in x on the probability of each state (see Greene, 2008 pages 772-774) . The estimation of the β parameters then requires the specification of a functional form for the distribution on the right hand side of equations (2) and (3). Either the normal distribution or the logistic distribution is used in the literature. We experimented with both of them and we noticed that results are basically the same. We report and comment on results obtained using the normal distribution: (3) where Φ(•) denotes the standard normal distribution.
The vector x includes, for each country in each period, a set of socioeconomic characteristics plus the fiscal policy variables. More specifically, we control for the quality of country's polity (polity), the timing of elections (elections), the degree of ethnic fragmentation (ethnix), and the level and growth rate of per-capita gdp (gdp_pc and growth respectively). Level and growth of per-capita GDP and fiscal policy variables are all lagged to reduce the risk of reverse causality.
5 Table 4 reports the estimated marginal effects of model (2)- (3). The marginal effects are formally defined as , where are the maximum likelihood estimates of β. Because of the way in which we have coded the binary dependent variable, a positive sign indicates that higher values of the variable reduce the probability of a successful post-conflict transition.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Before discussing the role of fiscal policy variables, it is worth taking a look at the impact of other socioeconomic controls. Elections and a better polity increase the chance of a successful post-conflict transition. This intuitive result is however hardly statistically significant. Ethnic fragmentation also reduces the risk of returning to violence in the postconflict period. Both findings are consistent with the results reported by Collier et al. (2008) . The role of per-capita income is instead ambiguous. The sign of the marginal effect of percapital GDP changes across different specifications of the x vector. However, when it is statistically significant, the marginal effect is positive, thus suggesting that richer economies are at higher risk of failure. This effect is however counter-balanced by the effect associated with the growth of per-capita GDP. The estimated coefficients on growth are again hardly significant in statistical terms. However their negative sign indicates that the quicker percapita GDP returns to its post-conflict level, the more likely it is that the post-conflict transition will end up successfully.
We now turn to the estimated marginal effects associated with the fiscal policy variables. In the attempt to reduce multicollinearity, we employ a smaller group of variables than the original 24. In particular, we build on the evidence of the previous subsection to see whether the largest mean differences documented in Table 3 correspond to statistically significant effects on the probability of success/failure of the post-conflict transition.
In column I of table 2 we look at expenditure variables. A higher level of total expenditures (exp) increases the probability of successfully completing the post-conflict transition. We suggest the following interpretation. A larger government implies a larger (and possibly more equitably distributed) peace dividend, thus making it optimal for both contending parties to maintain peace. The proportion of government consumption on total expenditure (gov_p) instead has a negative effect on the probability of successful post-conflict transition. Our idea is that for any given size of the government, the value of the peace dividend increases faster the more resources are allocated to productive expenditure. In this sense, a greater incidence of consumption relative to investment is not beneficial to peace stabilization. However, public wages do help promote peace (as indicated by the negative coefficient on wages_p) as they make rebellion a less attractive option for a larger number of people.
In column II we consider revenue variables. Total revenues (rev) do not play any statistically significant role, even though the negative sign is broadly in line with the idea that a larger government helps maintain post-conflict peace. A larger proportion of non-tax revenues (rev_ntx_p) instead reduces the probability of SPC. We believe that this effect is related to greed: non-tax revenues might capture the depth of fiscal exploitation of natural resources and hence they represent a rent that parties would like to appropriate with violence at some point in time during the post-conflict phase. Finally, more grants (grt_p_c) increase the probability of SPC. The effect is statistically large, meaning that grants significantly contribute to increasing the peace-payoff of the contending parties.
We consider the impact of the burden of debt in column III. As expected from the analysis of mean differences, a higher debt to GDP ratio (debt) does not seem to be an obstacle to successful post-conflict transition. In fact, in our sample, SPC is characterised by a systematically higher level of debt than UPC. Higher debt levels are therefore associated with a higher probability of SPC. At the same time, the fact that higher debt levels also involve a larger amount of resources to be used for interest payments (int_debt_p) does not seem to matter much in terms of probability of success of the post-conflict transition.
Finally, in column IV we look at the impact of the overall stability of the fiscal position. In fact, we tried all six different definitions of fiscal balance, and only bal_prim_grt happens to be statistically significant. A better primary balance (inclusive of grants) helps complete the post-conflict transition successfully. Our interpretation is that the enlargement of government size in the post-conflict phase is conducive to peace only if it involves both the expenditure side and the revenue side of the budget. On the contrary, if only expenditures are expanded (especially government consumption) than the chances of success do not necessarily increase.
Dynamic comparisons
We now turn to the analysis of the dynamic evolution of fiscal policy variables during the post-conflict transition. To this purpose we compute averages of fiscal policy variables in each state as follows. Let w ijt be the generic fiscal policy variable w observed at time t in country i in state j (where j = SPC, UPC). Then, the average taken over all is in state j at time t is w jt = , where n is the total number of countries in state j at time t. For each period t, the average of fiscal policy variables is defined as w j(t) = , where T = 1, 2...up to 10 (if j = SPC) or the start of a new conflict (if j = UPC). The sequence of w j(t) values therefore offers a dynamic representation of how the fiscal policy variable evolves over time in each state.
To highlight differences in the dynamic evolution, in Table 3 we report the difference w SPC(t) -w UPC(t) for t = 1, 2..5. The entire series w SPC(t) and w UPC(t) are reported in Tables 4 and 5 , but we limit our investigation to the first five years of post-conflict transition because, the number of countries in UPC is very small after the fifth year. The trends of some of the key fiscal policy variables are also depicted in figure 1.
INSERT TABLES 3, 4, 5 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE It appears from the table that SPC is initially characterised by lower revenues (rev) and lower expenditures (exp) than UPC. Revenues and expenditures grow during the first five years of transition in both SPC and UPC. However, while the average growth rate of expenditure is roughly the same in the two states (1.8% per year in UPC and 1.7% per year in SPC), the growth rate of revenues is significantly faster in SPC (2.7% per year versus 0.45% per year on average in UPC, see panel A of Figure 1 ). Therefore, a distinctive feature of successful post-conflict stabilizations is that the expansion of government size is matched by the increase in revenues, so that the overall fiscal position is not significantly destabilised.
At the beginning of the post-conflict transition, SPC is also characterised by lower levels of capital expenditure (exp_k), current expenditure (exp_c), and government consumption (gov) than UPC. However, the evolution of these components of expenditure in the first few years of transition is quite different across the two states. In the UPC state, the expansion in total government expenditure mostly takes the form of an increase in government consumption, while capital expenditure in proportion of GDP declines. On the contrary, in the SPC state all of the three components increase, but capital expenditure increases faster than the other two (2.9% per year against an increase of 1.4% a year of current expenditure and 0.3% a year of government consumption). As a result of these trends, the incidence of government consumption in total expenditure (gov_p) grows fast in UPC, while it declines in SPC state (see panel B of Figure 1 ).
The dynamic pattern of current grants (grt_c) is also quite interesting. The difference between SPC and UPC is quite small at the beginning of the transition. But then, the difference grows quickly during the first four years: while SPC is characterised by a steady increase in the flow of grants, UPC displays the opposite trend (see panel C of Figure 1 ). The fact that immediately at the beginning of the post-conflict transition grants are higher in the SPC state might suggest that the international community "picks-the-winner": among all post-conflict countries, some are chosen and receive a larger initial endowment of grants, which in turn puts them in the condition to sustain peace over the post-conflict period. However, the fact that over time the gap in the level of grants between the two states widens might indicate some endogeneity in the behaviour of the international community: grants tend to go to those countries that show more promising progress towards peace, while countries that initially struggle in maintaining peace receive less and less support. This sort of "disengagement" of the international community then leads to the failure of the post-conflict transition process.
The data in the table also confirm our previous findings on the role of debt. Not only total debt (debt) is initially significantly higher in SPC (see panel D of Figure 1 ), but the difference also grows over time. In SPC, the level of debt moderately increases in percent of GDP over the first five years of transition (1.4% per year), while in the UPC state it decreases. The proportion of resources devoted to interest payments (int_p) is systematically and persistently higher in SPC than in UPC. These findings might seem at odds with the evidence recently reported by UNDP (2008) on the contribution of debt relief to post-conflict recovery. However, we stress that there are two important differences between our analysis and UNDP's (2008) . First of all, we look at different samples of post-conflict episodes. Second, UNDP is mainly concerned with the correlation between debt service and post-conflict growth, while we look at how, after controlling for growth, debt affects the probability of stabilizing peace. In other words, we look at the role of debt from a sharply different angle than UNDP.
Finally, the analysis of the dynamics of military, education, and health expenditure is once again severely affected by the lack of data. The dynamic comparison must indeed be limited to the very first years of transition. It appears that SPC is effectively characterised by lower military expenditure (def). This expenditure also declines steadily (more than 8% per year) throughout the first five years of post-conflict transition. The decline seems however to be even faster in the UPC state in the first two years of transition. However, we have to stress that much of this decline is driven by the variations in the size of the military in Angola. Most of the other countries in UPC increase, albeit only marginally, their military expenditure between the first and the second year of post-conflict transition.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have studied the role of fiscal policy in determining the success or failure of post-conflict transition. Our idea is that fiscal policy is relevant because it can significantly affects the payoffs of the conflicting parties, thus strengthening (or weakening) their commitment to the peace agreement. We have then looked at the issue from an empirical perspective. Using a large collection of fiscal policy variables for the group of war-torn African countries, we have found that the fiscal dimension does matter, even after controlling for other possible determinants of war and peace. With respect to the specific case of the post conflict transition, our key results can be summarised as follows. The success of post-conflict transition does not require downsizing the government. On the contrary, successful postconflict transitions are on average characterised by an increase in the size of the government. However, this increase occurs in such a way that the overall stability of public finances is not heavily compromised: both expenditures and revenues increase at a comparable pace. Moreover, in successful post-conflict transitions, the increase in government size involves an increase in the incidence of capital expenditure relative to government consumption (whose contribution to horizontal redistribution is questionable). On the revenue side, budgetary grants appear to strengthen the chances of success. At the same time, and contrary to common-sense intuition, a larger burden of debt does not seem to compromise the probability of successfully completing the post-conflict transition.
From our results we can draw a few policy recommendations that we believe are also relevant to non-African post-conflict countries. First of all, countries in post-conflict transition should not pursue fiscal stability through a reduction in the size of government. On the contrary, there is need for a larger government in the first years after a war, so government expenditure should increase. However, this increase should not significantly exceed the rate of expansion of revenues. With the end of the conflict, the potential for tax collection will increase and government ought to strengthen their efforts in this direction. A balanced expansion of revenues and expenditures is likely to be more conducive to the success of the post-conflict transition than government downsizing.
Second, while expanding the overall size of the government, countries should also adjust the scope of the government. In this context, it appears to be important to promote capital expenditure, which is expected to strengthen the peace dividend over time. 6 The proportion of government consumption in total expenditure should correspondingly decrease and possibly more space should be given to targeted forms of redistribution to address horizontal inequalities between the fighting parties. Unfortunately we have limited data on education and health expenditure, but the little evidence we presented seems to suggest that the reallocation of resources from the military to the provision of public education and health will strengthen peace through two complementary effects: (i) a larger peace dividend and (ii) dynamically efficient redistribution.
Third, financial assistance in the form of budgetary grants might be more important than debt relief in the first years of post-conflict transition, at least from the perspective of maintaining peace. Because the debt burden does not appear to affect the chances of success, while grants do, the international community should consider a new approach in assisting post-conflict economies: in the immediate after-math of a war, debt cancellation ought to be replaced by direct budgetary assistance to compensate the weak capacity of governments to mobilize domestic resources. Of course, in the medium term, debt cancellation will remain important to improve the development prospects of the country.
Variables definition

Name code Definition
Fiscal variables in percent of GDP (source: African Development Indicators, World Bank, and National Statistical Offices)
Total expenditure
Exp Total expenditure and net lending includes both current and capital (development) expenditures and includes lending minus repayments.
Total revenues
Rev Total revenue and grants equals the sum of government revenue and grants. Revenue includes all nonrepayable and nonrepaying government receipts other than grants. Grants are defined as unrequited, nonrepayable, noncompulsory receipts.
Government consumption
Gov Current expenditure on goods and services comprises payments of wages and salaries in cash to employees (including the armed forces) before deduction of withholding taxes and employees' contributions to social security and pension funds, as well as employers' contributions to superannuation schemes outside government, and other purchases of goods and services (wages and salaries in kind, office supplies and maintenance charges etc.).
Wages and Salaries
Wages
Wages and salaries consist of all payments in cash, but not in kind, to central government employees in return for services rendered, before deduction of withholding taxes and employees contributions to social security and pension funds.
Current expenditure exp_c Total current expenditure includes requited payments other than for capital assets or for goods or services to be used in the production of capital assets, and unrequited payments for purposes other than permitting the recipients to acquire capital assets.
Capital expenditure
exp_k Expenditure for acquisition of land, intangible assets, government stocks, and nonmilitary and nonfinancial assets; also for capital grants and lending minus repayments.
Defence expenditure
Def Data generally cover expenditures of the ministry of defense (excluded are expenditures on public order and safety, which are classified separately).
Health expenditure
Health Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds.
Education expenditure
Edu
Total public expenditure is current and capital public expenditure on education plus subsidies to private education at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels by local, regional and national government including municipalities (household contributions excluded).
Non tax revenues
rev_ntx Receipts from sources other than the tax system, like property income, fees, fines, and contributions to government employee pension funds within government.
External capital grants
grt_k Grants are unrequited, nonrepayable, noncompulsory receipts of government from other governments or international institutions. In determination of the deficit/surplus, grants are grouped with revenue and expenditure rather than with financing.
Total current grants
grt_c Grants include grants from other foreign governments, international organizations, and other government units.
Total government debt
Debt Debt is the entire stock of direct government fixed-term contractual obligations to others outstanding on a particular date. It includes domestic and foreign liabilities such as currency and money deposits, securities other than shares, and loans. It is the gross amount of government liabilities reduced by the amount of equity and financial derivatives held by the government (end year).
Overall budget balance including current grants bal_ov_grt Defined as Total revenue including current grants minus total expenditure and net lending (author's definition)
Overall budget balance excluding current grants bal_ov Defined as the overall budget balance including current grants minus total current grants (author's definition)
Current budget balance including current grants bal_c_grt Defined as total current revenues including grants minus total current expenditure (author's definition)
Current budget balance excluding current grants bal_c Defined as the current budget balance including current grants minus total current grants (author's definition) et al. (1999) .
Quality of the polity
Polity Quality of the polity defined in terms of democracy and autocracy. The variable takes values between -10 (absolute autocracy) and +10 (perfect democracy). Source: Polity IV database. 1966-1971 1980-1988 1990 UNDP (2008) Notes: average of fiscal policy variables at years 1, 2..., 10 of successful post-conflict transitions. All averages are computed over the total of 13 successful post-conflict episodes for which fiscal data are available. 
Time of elections
